Abstract: Strawson's work seems to contain both pragmatic and semantic concepts of presupposition. The former concept has largely been studied by many philosophers and linguists, while the latter has not been properly investigated (van Fraassen being an exception). The present author explicates the semantic concept of existential presupposition in relation to deriving existential statements and distinguishing their de dicto/de re variants (in the rather generalized sense following Tichý).
Introduction
As Frege noticed, substitutivity of identicals (SI) fails when applied to belief sentences such as 'Xenia believes that the Morning Star is the Morning Star', given the identity 'The Morning Star is the Evening Star'. Frege's diagnosis is well-known: whereas the second premise says, by means of the two descriptions, that Venus is self-identical, the context of the description 'the Morning Star' occurring in the first premise is indirect, thus the description pinpoints not its reference (Bedeutung), viz. Venus, but its sense (Sinn). Another awkward feature of belief sentences was reported by Quine (1943) -even existential generalization (EG) can fail. But consider rather a principle I will call existential exportation, φ[a] ∴ ∃x(x=a). It fails when applied to 'Xenia believes that the King of France is bald' because 'There exists an individual who is the King of France' might be false whereas the premise true. Quine's observation then resembles that of Frege-in the premise the description 'the King of France' is used in a non-referential way.
It is also well-known that Frege did not offer a logical explication of sense. On the other hand, it was Russell who suggested a rather surprising proposal: descriptions are meaningless in isolation. Challenging Frege, he espoused that descriptions such as 'the Morning Star' do not mention any particular individual, e.g., Venus, thus they are not about them. But Russell claimed more than this: there is also no sense, an entity determining an individual the way Frege's senses-modes of presentation-do. Despite being meaningless, descriptions contribute to the contents of sentences through the properties they mention. For instance, 'the F' mentions the property F, so the logical form ∃x (Fx ∧ ∀y (Fy → (y=x)) ∧ Gx) of the sentence 'the F is G' contains F. This elimination of a description preserves some our intuitions about the meaning of 'the F is G'. For instance, the sentence 'the F is G' is true if there is one and only one individual which is an F, and it is also a G. Beginning with the existential quantifier, it is determinately false otherwise.
Let us turn to the famous lesson Strawson gave in his seminal paper "On Referring" (1950) . According to him, we use descriptions such as 'the King of France' in such a way that when nobody is the king of France, the sentence 'the King of France is bald' is not false but without a truth-value-when there is no king of France, the question of truth or falsity does not arise (ibid., 330) . 1 Strawson introduces a general explanation for this view. As I see it, every sentence presupposes more than it explicitly says; when at least one of its presuppositions is false, the sentence is not true or false.
The present paper concentrates on the notion of presupposition within a framework focusing on sentences, not their uses (as Strawson's did). Although many theoreticians concluded from Strawson's paper that we should study pragmatic issues, I am interested here in the semantic notion of presupposition. We should bear in mind that there is at least one theoretician who explored presupposition as a purely semantic notion, namely van Fraassen (1969) . He stressed the importance of Strawson's view, namely the admission of truthvalue gaps, and he revealed its rather formal treatment which was further studied within the framework of three-valued logics. This paper utilizes a logic which allows truth-value gaps because it treats partial functions. But firstly I am going to shed light on the semantic content of descriptions in order to explain why there is an alleged sensitivity to the contexts in which they occur, which causes some of the classical laws of logic to fail. Two kinds of suppositions of descriptions (and other expressions) will be distinguished, each susceptible to a different kind of existential exportation. Existential presuppositions are then seen as results of the respective existential exportations from non-quantified sentences.
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Explication of Meaning and Suppositions De Dicto/De Re
Referentialists, as I shall call them, say that the subject matter of a sentence such as 'The Pope is popular'-when occurring in direct contexts-involves Ratzinger, i.e. the reference of the description. Similarly, 'The Pope is the Archbishop of Rome' is about Ratzinger's self-identity. However, one may ask how 'The Pope is popular' can be about Ratzinger who is not expressly mentioned in the sentence. It seems better to claim that what the sentence 'The Pope is popular' is semantically about is perfectly understandable without knowing the 1 Note, however, that there is not only the partial truth predicate (some propositions are not evaluated as true or false), there is also a total one, whose mate is not the 'false' predicate, but the total predicate 'not true' (it applies to propositions that are false or without a truth-value). Though Russell misunderstood the importance of partiality and presupposition, he drew attention to the notion of a total falsity predicate (1957, 388) . Another note (thanks to the reviewer): after 1964, Strawson admitted that some sentences with non-denoting descriptions may be sometimes false rather than truth-valueless. 2 The author is indebted to P. Cmorej and P. Kuchyňka for their comments on the 2006 version of this paper. A more extensive elaboration of the views given here is presented in Raclavsky (2009). contingent fact that Ratzinger is the Pope. Thus one can object to the referentialists' claim that competent users of English know what they mean by the words they use even if they are unaware of extralinguistic empirical facts. Knowing empirical facts is hardly part of the linguistic convention of associating English words with meanings-one can learn English without knowing the facts that obtain.
One may then follow Tichý (see esp. his 1975 paper) in claiming that an empirical expression is always (in any context) about the mentioned item and not about its contingent reference, i.e. the thing unmentioned by the expression. However, this claim might be seen as puzzling. To elucidate the matter further, we need to realize that descriptions can signify things in two distinct ways. In most cases, the purpose of a description such as 'the Pope' is to single out an individual, say Ratzinger, who is presently the Pope. The purpose of a typical sentence containing this kind of description is to predicate to the referred individual, the unmentioned res, a certain property. Yet the semantic content of 'the Pope' cannot be identified with that particular individual, since Ratzinger is the Pope only by contingent chance and the contingent factor surely should not affect the semantic content. "The Pope", the subject matter of the description, is thus not an individual but rather something that a particular individual can be. It is an entity which in certain circumstances picks out Ratzinger and in other circumstances Wojtyla, etc. The influencing factors in question are known as possible worlds and entities such as "the Pope" are then identified with functions from possible worlds to individuals. I will often refer to these intensions using Tichý's "philosophical" term individual offices. An individual office is an entity that an individual can (on some conditions) fill, embody, occupy-becoming thus the holder of the office. Natural language enables us to speak not only about individuals occupying various offices but also about individual offices as such. For instance, the "Pope-office" is the subject matter (as well as the subject of predication) of sentences such as 'The Pope is an important political post'. Unlike "(be) blue-eyed", the property "(be an) interesting political post" is not instantiable by individuals-it is sensibly ascribable only to individual offices.
We will construe the previously considered kind of occurrence of a description in a sentence as its de re supposition, and this occurrence here as its de dicto supposition. Generally, the de dicto supposition of an expression amounts to the expression's pointing out only the thing semantically connected with it, i.e. just and only what is mentioned, its dictum. The de re supposition of an expression amounts to pointing out the thing not mentioned by the expression, namely its reference, i.e. the res.
One should not conclude, however, that in the de re supposition the significance of a description, what the description is semantically about, is exhausted by its reference to a certain res. Consider a mathematical analogy: the expression 'the cosine of 60° is less than 1' is an analogue of the de re predication, and 'the cosine is a periodical function' is an analogue of the de dicto predication. It seems futile to deny that in the analogue of the de re case the expression 'the cosine of 60°' signifies only the res and the cosine function is entirely missing in the semantic content. It is more natural to think that in the de re supposition the description still preserves its denotation. But unlike the de dicto case where the denotation is all that is relevant, in the de re case both denotation and reference come into place. Of course, the reference is inevitable for the verification of a sentence including a description in the supposition de re (while in the de dicto case the possible reference of a description is irrelevant). But singling out a res, the expression's reference to it, is something additional to a more fundamental matter, which is the proper denotation of the expression which is specified by linguistic convention.
The generalizing feature of this conception of Tichý's, the de dicto/de re suppositions (see especially his 1978 paper), is based on conceiving of the majority of natural language expressions as denoting various offices (most of them being partial functions). Thus whenever it seems that the reference of an expression varies, the expression denotes an office (of an appropriate type) and the variability is nothing but a variability of holders of that office. For instance, an expression such as 'man' refers to this or that class of individuals dependent on possible worlds; thus the property of individuals it denotes is an office occupiable by classes of individuals. Other well-known kinds of offices involve propositions, i.e. offices occupiable by truth-values (T or F). And so forth. -an expression E expresses (means) -a construction C, i.e. logical explication of meaning, which constructs -an intension or a non-intension, i.e. the denotation of E.
The value of an intension denoted by an expression in a given possible world W is called the reference of that expression in W (to ascertain the reference of such an expression one must empirically investigate the state of affairs). Constructions, mentioned in this semantic scheme, are abstract (language independent) entities of an algorithmic nature (for more see Tichý 1988) . They are typically structured (the way functions-mappings are not). Constructions are usually written using some kind of lambda term; 5 I shall use a considerably simplified form of notation.
Tichý's theory of de dicto/de re suppositions can be developed in more than one way. I will use my own elaboration based on constructions; 6 its essentials can be characterized as follows. Firstly, there is a (simplified) rule for de re/de dicto supposition of constructions:
A construction D, which is a subconstruction of a construction C and which constructs an intension, is in the supposition de re in C if it is composed with the possible world variable w (or w', etc.) and the variable w is either free in C, or bound by the foremost λ-operator of the construction C; otherwise D occurs in C in the supposition de dicto. Constructions not constructing intensions are always in the supposition de dicto (in any construction in which they occur).
Secondly, there is a (simplified) correspondence rule:
An expression expressing the construction D is in the supposition de dicto/de re in an expression expressing the construction C in accordance with the supposition of the construction D in the construction C.
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Examples. The construction P, constructing the Pope-office, as well as the construction Popular, constructing a property of individuals, is in the supposition de re in the construction (constructing a proposition):
On the other hand, the construction λw [Popular w P w ] (or the construction w) is in the supposition de dicto in it. The construction λw [Popular w P w ] prescribes the procedure "(for any W) take the extension of the property "(be) popular" in the possible world W, take the holder of the Pope-office in W and apply that class (i.e. that characteristic function) to that individual". This construction is expressed by the sentence:
The Pope is popular.
It is in accordance with our pre-theoretical intuition that 'the Pope' as well as 'popular' are intended to signify an unmentioned res, i.e. both 'the Pope' and 'popular' are in the supposition de re in the whole sentence (whereas 'The Pope is popular' as such is in the supposition de dicto).
Unlike this case of a de re predication, consider an example of a de dicto predication made by the sentence:
The Pope-office is an interesting political post. expressing the construction:
in which P occurs in the supposition de dicto. The whole construction prescribes the procedure "(for any W) take the extension of the property of individual offices "(be an) interesting political post" in W and apply it to the Pope-office as such". That is: do not call for the holder of the Pope-office in W-the contingent holder of the office plays no role in the verification of the sentence.
The subsequent section differentiates de dicto/de re existential exportations, consequences and presuppositions. One might ask why we should do that. The answer is that it really does matter. Consider the well-known modal logic formula ∀xy ((x=y) → (x=y)) which is tailored for de dicto cases in our sense. One can substitute (for x and y) "2+3" and "√25" without any harm. However, some theoreticians substituted "the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star" and they ended up with an extremely odd result. Naturally, the identity between "the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star" holds de re, not de dicto-the offices are distinct, though they contingently happen to have the same holder.
De Re Existential Exportations/Consequences/Presuppositions
DE RE EXISTENTIAL EXPORTATION will be taken to mean an inferential technique allowing us to step from (non-quantified) sentences such as: The sentence (∃P) is a DE RE EXISTENTIAL CONSEQUENCE of (PP) and (¬PP) whereas P is in the supposition de re in (PP), (¬PP) and also in (∃P). (Alternatively, we can derive 'There exists a class of individuals which are popular', λw.∃s [s = Popular w ], which is also a de re existential consequence of (PP) and (¬PP).) Now let us specify the classical precept concerning presuppositions (Strawson 1952, 152; initially 1950 ; see also van Fraassen 1968, 137) : If a positive de re existential consequence P is such that its truth (in a possible world W) is a necessary condition for the sentence S-from which it was derived-to have any truth-value (in W), then P is a DE RE EXISTENTIAL PRESUPPOSITION of the sentence S as well as the negation of S. (Analogously for the level of constructions.) For instance, (∃P) is a de re existential presupposition of (PP) and (¬PP). Here are some observations on this explication. For obvious reasons, negative de re existential statements cannot be de re existential presuppositions. Further, many sentences have more than one positive de re existential consequence or presupposition the truth of which is necessary for the given sentence or its negation to have a truth-value. Note that typical positive de re existential consequences are non-tautological and non-contradictory, thus they are true or false contingently; we can call them CONTINGENT de re existential consequences/presuppositions.
But there are also atypical de re existential consequences/presuppositions, since they are TAUTOLOGICAL. Consider the sentence:
It is true that the Pope is popular or it is true that 1=1.
expressing the construction:
whereas the "totalizing" predicate 'true T ' denotes a property of propositions (it assigns T to propositions having the truth-value T in W, but it assigns F to propositions having the truth-value F or no truth-value in W). Both constructions expressed by the embedded sentences are in the supposition de re in the whole construction and we may derive a de re existential consequence such as (the variable o constructs truth-values):
In virtue of the meaning of 'true T ', it is tautologically true that there is a truth-value of the proposition that it is true T that the Pope is popular. It is obvious that only certain sentences have tautological de re existential presuppositions.
An additional remark: In recent decades, various theoreticians (e.g. Fintel 2006 ) have disregarded Strawson's lesson on presuppositions, alluding to examples of sentences such as 'Xenia speaks with the king of France' which have no-on natural construal-(de re) existential presupposition as regards the king of France. However, the theoreticians have overlooked the difference between attributive verbs (e.g., 'is popular') and episodic verbs (e.g., 'speak', 'eat', etc.). I claim that sentences governed by episodic verbs do not have de re existential presupposition (this claim follows from Tichý's logical analysis of episodic verbs, Tichý 1980 It is clear that they are tautological for they follow from the axiom of identity. Although such presuppositions might not be seen as interesting as typical de re presuppositions which are true contingently, they are also presuppositions of the respective sentences.
Note that on the level of constructions P is in the supposition de re in λw [Popular w P w ] and also in λw.∃x [x = P w ], though P w is in the supposition de dicto in them.
10 Thus we are unable to decide whether (∃P) was derived from (PP) by means of the de re or de dicto existential exportation. Let us call constructions/sentences such as (∃P) DE RE&DICTO EXISTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES/PRESUPPOSITIONS of constructions/sentences such as (PP). They form a class of atypical de dicto consequences/presuppositions because they are (usually) CONTINGENT. But there is also another kind of contingent de dicto existential consequence/ presuppositions. One can derive from (PP), in which [Popular w P w ] occurs in the supposition de dicto, an atypical de dicto consequence:
which is not a de re&dicto consequence of (PP). Nevertheless, it is true contingently, dependent on [Popular w P w ] (which is hard to express using a natural language expression) which constructs a particular truth-value as regards to this or that possible world.
Some Prospects for the Proposal
De Re/De Dicto Belief Sentences and Existential Presuppositions. This paper might be found incomplete without a demonstration of its connection to problems with beliefs sentences (whereas "believe" is construed simply as a relation-in-intension between individuals and propositions). Consider their de re case first. The sentence:
The Pope is such that Xenia believes that he is popular. expresses the construction:
Being composed with w which is bound by the foremost λ of the whole construction, the construction P is in the supposition de re-in accordance with the supposition of 'the Pope' 11 Of course, λw' [Popular w' P w' ] (constructing an intension, namely a proposition) is in the supposition de dicto in the whole construction because it is not composed with w which is bound by the foremost λ of the whole construction (or with w free in it).
in the sentence. The sentence has a de re existential presupposition that there is an individual who is the Pope, i.e. (∃P). As for the de dicto case, consider (slightly superfluously α-renamed) construction:
expressed by:
Xenia believes that the Pope is popular.
The construction P is in the supposition de dicto in the whole construction because it is composed with the variable w' that is not bound by the foremost λ or free in the whole construction.
11 Thus there is no de re existential presupposition as regards the Pope, i.e. that there is somebody who is the Pope is irrelevant for the verification of the whole sentence. This is analogous for modalities. The sentence:
The Pope is such that he might not be the Pope.
expresses:
in which P occurs-in its second occurrence-in the supposition de re, i.e. we predicate some property to that individual (if any) who is the actual Pope, thus there is a respective de re existential presupposition as regards the Pope. The whole construction is equivalent to:
The Pope might not be the Pope. Thus we fit the idea that a sentence (or even a class of sentences) commits to that which it "existentially" presupposes.
When a theoretician speaks about an existential import of a sentence, she does not discuss the existence of entities such as numbers or offices − instead she evokes contingent facts, such as there exists a holder of a certain office. In accordance with this common construal:
TO HAVE EXISTENTIAL IMPORT = to have a de re existential consequence (presupposition) Note that the occupant of an office (e.g., the property "(be) popular") might be the empty class, thus it does not follow that there exists a member of that class. That is: instantiation de re existential statements are not entailed by occupancy de re existential statements (of course, the reverse direction is a valid inference). In sequel, instantiation de re statements are not de re existential presuppositions.
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Existential Presuppositions and Deduction. As stated above, existential presuppositions are (in normal cases) existential consequences derivable by existential exportations of the de re or de dicto kind. We can then aptly utilize Tichý's system of deduction (cf. especially his 1986 paper). Its sketchy characterization: a so-called match shows that a certain object is constructed, dependent on valuation v, by a certain construction. There are three basic kinds of matches, X:C (the object X is v-constructed by the construction C), x:C (an object of the type ξ, ranged over by x, is v-constructed by C), :C (no object is v-constructed by C). Deduction rules are built from sequents M 1 ⇒ M 2 which permits us to derive the succedent match M 2 from the antecedent match M 1 (an antecedent can be a string of matches, which I will omit here − nor will I introduce a deduction rule as meant by Tichý). In accordance with the above proposal we have:
(the antecedents involve constructions v-constructing nothing, thus the construction of the succedent v-constructs the truth-value F) and:
(the antecedents involve constructions v-constructing a certain truth-value thus the construction of the succedent v-constructs the truth-value T).
Failures of De Dicto/De Re Existential Exportation
There are genuine failures of the de dicto and de re existential exportations as considered above. The first example I am going to give is perceptible on the level of constructions as well as on the level of expressions. The other two examples are tangible on the level of constructions only.
On the natural construal of entailment, the sentence (lacking a truth-value):
The quotient of 3 and 0 is equal to 1.
does not entail its seeming de dicto existential consequence:
There exists a number which is the quotient of 3 and 0.
Let us call such "consequences" CONTRADICTORY PARTIALITY DE DICTO EXISTENTIAL QUASI-CONSEQUENCES (of course, they cannot be presuppositions of the respective sentences). Now consider the construction (the example follows M. Duží, e.g., Duží et al. 2010) :
which is doubtfully the meaning of any natural language sentence. The embedded open propositional construction λw' [Popular w' P w ] occurs in the supposition de dicto in (D). However, P does not, for it is composed with the variable w which is bound by the foremost λ-operator of (D), thus it is in the supposition de re in (D). Yet we cannot infer (∃P) from (D). Let me explain. When nobody is the Pope in W, the proposition v-constructed by λw' [Popular w' P w ] is undefined for all possible worlds. On the other hand, when there is an individual who is the Pope in W, say Ratzinger, the embedded construction v-constructs the proposition that Ratzinger is popular. Consequently, (D) is true dependent on Xenia's attitude towards the "right" proposition which is v-constructed by the embedded propositional construction. However, (∃P) is not a de re existential consequence of (D The failure just discussed is caused by the construction of the kind of composition which cannot v-construct anything when it is a composition containing a construction of a partial intension which is not defined at the argument constructed by the second part of the composition. On the other hand, when a certain construction occurring in the de re totalizing context (like that in which P occurs in (D)) is a construction constructing (for any v) a total intension, then the respective positive de re (or de re&dicto) consequence can be tautological (thus it can also be its presupposition).
Yet totalizing contexts are not exhausted by cases connected with the constructions of offices (intensions To conclude, deduction rules of existential exportation and existential presupposition cannot be stated as one simply might have wished. This means that the proper deduction rules of existential exportation and existential presupposition have to be suitably conditioned-cf. Tichý's notions of hospitability and exposure (etc.) in Tichý (1986) .
